The demonstrations have been accompanied by looting and clashes between groups of individuals and police officers, through whom the state exercises ‘legitimate' violence. Yet this does not mean that state violence cannot overstep the bounds of the social contract, whereby citizens entrust their natural liberties to the state to ensure civil peace, maintained in part through the use of force.
Hooded figures smashing shop windows and armoured officers kicking people on the ground re-enact an age-old confrontation with power, in which the people are reduced either to a crowd or to isolated individuals. As political polarization deepens and competing, one-sided narratives clash, the state's coercive power comes to the fore.
Across the eight years of Emmanuel Macron's presidency, from the gilets jaunes to the sporadic protest outbreaks of the past weeks, the same social causes have produced much the same effects. Yet the face of protest has changed dramatically: from people travelling to Paris from the provinces wearing the high-vis vests emblematic of the roundabout protests, to school students and groups in black tracksuits damaging public buildings.
The urban riots of 2023 were seen as an expression of unrest in the disadvantaged suburbs, with large numbers of very young people taking to the streets, resorting to looting rather than joining organized marches. The violence was scattered, episodic and reactive in a public space longer seen as a forum for peaceful assembly and free expression, but as a site of confrontation with the established order.
But the violence was produced by both sides. Many will remember the surprise of the gilets jaunes, who had come to the wealthy enclaves of power to air their grievances, only to encounter a brutal police response that suggested there was no political alternative.
Image: Mzn17 / Source: Wikimedia Commons
What does the Republic have left to offer?
As Macron approaches a decade in power, how has his government responded to public anger and the reality of widespread discontent? What was needed was a new social contract to legitimize the political order; instead, we got batons and ‘non-lethal' weapons that sometimes kill and often maim.
Since 2018, this show of force has deterred people from joining peaceful demonstrations. States of emergency declared on security and health grounds have further reinforced the binary opposition between the sovereign state and scattered individuals, at precisely the moment when the generation that is now protesting came of age politically, having been penned in during the pandemic.
By now we are accustomed to the spectacle of public authorities banning, rerouting and splitting up marches, ordering the use of tear gas before any unrest has even begun, and discouraging the exercise of the most collective of liberties: the right to freedom of assembly. Not to mention the right to resist oppression, which has been erased from the declarations of rights of the post-revolutionary republics as if the violence that founded their political system was no longer possible.
Yet these same young people, who pay more attention than we give them credit for, are taught something quite different at school: that the Republic was born in blood in the pursuit of its ideals. If the Republic no longer guarantees liberty, equality, and fraternity, what does it have to offer? Macron championed revolution in the title of his 2017 campaign manifesto, and today we find ourselves with impotent institutions and a society in flames.
The movement was fuelled by the terrifying summer we endured, with no political solution to the oppressive climate that frayed our nerves and cast a pall of despair over the places we call home. We live in a dystopia: we are left to face droughts, viruses and wars without hospitals, schools or armed forces, each of us left to fend for ourselves, with a family home to retreat to if we are lucky – and if not, then what?
Social benefits are being cut and increasingly serve to make people feel guilty, rather than help them build better lives; meanwhile, there is less work available, working conditions are harsher, the cost of living has risen, and war has been a constant refrain in presidential rhetoric since 2020. Our country no longer offers the young or the vulnerable a future. The ballot box makes clear how much more radical young people's voting choices are than those of an ageing population, a tendency also visible on the streets, albeit among a small minority.
The frantic targeting of the far Left in recent days will not be forgotten. Macron has called the Left ‘insurrectionists', just as during the Benalla affair in July 2018 he challenged his critics to ‘come and get him'. This will not silence the anger, sedition, or what is ultimately a thoroughly capitalist act: appropriating material goods of absurdly high value. Although many smaller shops have been targeted, the sight of smashed windows on the Champs-Élysées is a striking image of capitalism in decline.
But holding La France Insoumise (LFI) responsible for these scattered and disparate offences shows first and foremost an inability to discuss the phenomenon before us in political terms, whatever one's opinion of the ideas and methods of the party or its founder, Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
Acts of violence are legally the responsibility of the individuals involved; politically or morally, however, they are just as attributable to those who ordered crowds to be kettled and beaten as they are to the LFI.Among those responsible, I would also include those who depoliticize the violence and ignore the fact that major political and social change is needed to escape the cycle of violence. Since the gilets jaunes, it is not only people's bodies that have been assaulted, but the very will to gather in public. The absence of that will represents a profound rupture in people's faith in the democratic ideal.
I would like to bring a personal emotional dimension to this analysis. Any violence leaves me saddened, and the images from 2018, 2023 and 2026, of lives so brutally damaged, are abhorrent to me, so far removed from everything we should expect of life together in society. As in 2023, when I see these very young, often racialized people, many of them from the deprived banlieues, caught up in a spiral of violence that is both theirs and beyond their control, I cannot help but imagine how their lives may be derailed by injuries, arrests or convictions. The risks are enormous, both for them and the innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire.
Our society, suffering the effects of neoliberalism and increasingly extreme methods employed by the authorities, must have reached staggering levels of mistrust and division for someone to decide to express themselves in this way; for them to feel so far outside the social order that violence becomes possible, just as the routine use of batons against ordinary protesters has become possible.
Making sense of 17 October
Each of us must wrestle with the question of why so many people have come together to confront the police, who are themselves victims of this political and social violence, despite their superior weapons and protective equipment. We all bear responsibility for this collective movement, but the time will also come to identify those to blame.
Some people are desperate to interpret the violence as a war of manoeuvre waged by insurrectionists, shoehorning in an ideological interpretation of events, perhaps to avoid acknowledging that the war of position, in the Gramscian sense of winning society over to a set of values, is turning in favour of the far-right counterrevolution. The far right's resources are spread across the various arenas in which political narratives are produced, including those shaping the perception that the political or cultural left poses a threat to the established order. For Gramsci, armed insurrection arose in societies where the state did everything and civil society was weak: we have seen both crumble.
There has been a hint of the Reichstag fire in the political debates of recent days. In 1933, the NSDAP claimed the Communist Party was behind this symbolic end to the Weimar Republic, even when it was shown in court that the individuals responsible had no party affiliations and were not part of any coordinated movement. The same will be shown to be true today.
The far right is laying claim to the moral high ground, while continuing to draw on the violence of extremist fringe groups. The centrist parties, hard as it is for some to admit, have been complicit in the political choices that have led to the current situation. Social bonds have frayed to such an extent that a growing number of citizens no longer see institutions as legitimate.
Our political system is showing its inability to govern in any way other than meeting violence with violence. With no absolute majority in parliament supporting the government appointed by the president, and the state's financial situation worsening due to the parliament's inability to reach agreement, some might be surprised that a revolution has not yet occurred.
Our Republic is in genuine crisis: its institutions are unable to generate their own legitimacy, and the centre of power is becoming increasingly radical in its stubborn rejection of any change. With prices becoming unmanageable for the working and middle classes, the grotesque disparity in resources, the brazen display of extreme wealth, and war spreading across Europe, how can anyone think that the Republic can continue as before?
Institutions become cold and distant when they are no longer rooted in a shared sense of purpose. Today we must ask the question: Who feels represented as a citizen, and who feels excluded? The answer lies not only in sociological descriptions, but also in the choices we want to make about inclusion.
How to be heard
Violence is always a tragedy, not only for the innocent, but also for those who confront power or who are swept up in a spontaneous movement. And it has nothing to offer the most vulnerable, the isolated and unheard, something I think about when taking part in any demonstration that descends into violence, because of a dual movement of fervour and force that rules out the very possibility of democracy.
But a small voice inevitably replies: How can we make ourselves heard, how can we change things when those in power refuse to budge, and when the shadow of even greater inequality and ruined lives under the far Right creeps ever closer? For those who want possibility, and not to suffocate, we face a huge risk of having our political narrative stolen by the great lie of restoring order – and by the far Right's own lie: promising better days by getting rid of a few scapegoats, without doing anything to change the unequal distribution of power and wealth.
I felt the same sadness at the time of the Deranque affair, named after the 23-year-old neo-fascist activist who died following an assault on the sidelines of a conference on Palestine. And I asked myself the same question: how can we return to, if not institutional politics, then at least a social, collective politics of debate, free from factionalism, rather than seeing armed conflict as the only answer?
The far Right cast itself as the victim, and some on the far Left saw themselves as responsible for organizing civilian self-defence (especially after the death of the young antifascist activist Clément Méric). The fact that these young adults see themselves as being in a state of war must prompt us to ask ourselves collectively what place we give to violence in the life of the political community.
Is it the power of ideology over reality, or a damaged subjectivity, that pushes people to throw themselves into battle in this way? These young people who protest or sometimes clash with one another, with varying degrees of politicization, tell us something, just as the gilets jaunes did when they were accused of stirring up conflict in public life. Such young people emerge where conflict becomes visible and inevitable.
What these events require of us
A precondition of any progress is for the state to cease its oppression and return to its role of serving the republican project. But the collective movement that these events call for goes much further, encompassing three forms of revolution that often overlap over time: regime change, changes in attitudes and positions, and finally a conscious, personal revolution that rejects the face-off between the individual and society – or the state.
We urgently need to distinguish violence from political radicalism, which is far more valuable in a democracy, as it goes beyond the total freedom of a few and instead entails a fragile form of autonomy. Political autonomy plays out in the space between the community – groups politicized to varying extents that become caught up in violence in the heat of the moment – and the multitude: the other, far-off horizon, that of possibilities and diverse lives envisioning a shared movement.
As a way of engaging with the world, radicalism cannot be reduced to individual action or extremism on a political spectrum. When people say that ecoterrorists, antifascists and anarchists threaten us, we must respond by asking about the precise nature of this threat. We can see varying relationships to violence and also a potential continuum between organized groups and those with varying degrees of politicization, formed in the opportunities presented by looting or the urgency of political demands.
To repeat: radicalism cannot be reduced to violence, but is an essential form of politicization when change fails to materialize. Political radicalism cannot be conceptualized as pure action, undertaken ‘now' in a spirit of urgency, in anticipation of distant futures, even in the face of the most pressing dangers. It is a difficult position, between the ruins of a world of injustice and the ideal of a pure revolution, between the secession of the streets and the calm of the corridors of power.
The journey of the anarchist Emma Goldman at the turn of the twentieth century, before the rise of fascism, illustrates this problem well. Initially in thrall to violent action and the bombs planted by her comrades, she later renounced the ‘mad idea' that the ends justify the means in a famous text, after ‘years of experience and suffering'.
While recognizing the violence that inevitably arises from a deeply felt sense of injustice among more politically engaged individuals, and seeing violence primarily in the state's repression, Goldman refused to separate out the means from the ethical ends, and no longer saw violence as a political ideal, especially because of the risks it posed to individuals, including innocent people. This is what we must rekindle today: not the choice between order and violence, but the power of ideals and the ways in which they can be made real in a shared world.

Published in cooperation with CAIRN International Edition


