South West Conflict: An Expanding Threat and President Hassan Sheikh's Political Responsibility
Analysis
BAIDOA, Somalia — The fighting that has erupted in Baidoa demonstrates that the political dispute between the Federal Government and the administration of Abdiaziz Hassan Mohamed Laftagareen is developing into an armed conflict that threatens civilians, Somalia's federal system and the campaign against Al-Shabaab.
At least four civilians were killed in the latest fighting, while another 98 were wounded, according to an official at Bay Regional Hospital. The wounded included 28 women and an elderly man struck by a stray bullet. The Federal Government said nearly 30 members of the forces that attacked the city were killed, although that figure has not been independently verified.
This was not an isolated security incident. It resulted from Villa Somalia's decision to employ military force in a political and electoral dispute that could initially have been resolved through dialogue.
Federal forces took control of Baidoa on March 30, forcing Laftagareen to announce his resignation and subsequently leave the city. He later maintained that he remained the lawful president of South West State.
The Federal Government, whose mandate has expired under the four-year timetable of the 2012 Provisional Constitution, characterised the takeover as a restoration of constitutional order. Laftagareen and his supporters described it as a coup that dismantled an elected administration.
Following the takeover, Sheikh Aden Mohamed Nur Madobe was declared president of South West State on June 10 after receiving 88 of the 90 votes cast.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and his political allies presented the election as part of a universal-suffrage process founded on Somalia's controversially amended Constitution. However, Aden Madobe's opponents described it as a contest designed to produce a predetermined winner.
Villa Somalia therefore succeeded in capturing Baidoa, removing Laftagareen and establishing an administration it supports. What it did not secure was a political settlement acceptable to South West State's competing parties.
The result is that an electoral dispute has become a war in which civilians and soldiers are dying.
History reappears in Baidoa's political conflict
What is now happening in Baidoa recalls the events of 1995 that led to the establishment of the Rahanweyn Resistance Army, or RRA.
Following the collapse of Somalia's central government in 1991, the agricultural regions between the Jubba and Shabelle rivers became battlegrounds for armed factions. Farms were looted, livestock was taken, food supplies were disrupted and communities were displaced.
Human rights organisations reported that the destruction and looting of agricultural communities contributed substantially to the catastrophic famine that struck southern Somalia. Baidoa became internationally known as the “City of Death.â€
In March 1995, Digil and Mirifle leaders established a local authority known as the Digil–Mirifle Supreme Governing Council.
On September 17, 1995, forces belonging to warlord General Mohamed Farah Aidid captured Baidoa and removed the local administration. Aidid's forces represented the strongest military power in the area and used that strength to determine who would govern the city.
Less than one month later, on October 13, 1995, elders, politicians, intellectuals and former military officers assembled at Jhaffey, west of Baidoa, where they established the Rahanweyn Resistance Army.
Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur Shatigadud was elected chairman, while Sheikh Aden Madobe and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade became members of its senior leadership.
The RRA was established to resist the principle that a military force stronger than the local population could occupy its territory, remove its administration and then determine its political future.
The RRA recaptured Hudur in 1998 and Baidoa on June 6, 1999. General Aidid had died in 1996, so the forces expelled from the city were then commanded by his son, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid.
The RRA's victory eventually led to the establishment of an autonomous South West administration in 2002, with Baidoa as its capital.
The lesson from that history was that capturing Baidoa did not automatically create political legitimacy. It produced armed resistance.
A similar method in a different period
The circumstances of 1995 and 2026 are not identical. In 1995, Aidid was a factional leader operating in a country without a functioning central government. The forces presently deployed in Baidoa formally belong to the Somali National Army and take orders from a Federal Government whose mandate and constitutional legitimacy remain disputed.
Nevertheless, the political methods possess similarities that cannot be ignored: a military force stronger than the regional administration entered Baidoa, removed the existing leadership, took control of government institutions and subsequently organised a political process intended to legitimise the new order.
The difference between a government possessing legitimacy and one sustained by force is determined by public acceptance—not by the number of soldiers protecting the presidential compound.
Aden Madobe and the painful irony of RRA history
Aden Madobe's role makes the situation historically sensitive.
He was among the RRA leaders who resisted an earlier takeover of Baidoa by a militarily superior force that removed the local administration. Thirty years later, he became the direct political beneficiary of another military takeover of the same city.
In 2002, the RRA itself divided between a faction led by Shatigadud and another led by his deputies, Aden Madobe and Mohamed Ibrahim Habsade.
Fighting erupted in Baidoa, and the city changed hands several times. Civilians once again paid the price of a political struggle among the former resistance movement's leaders.
That history demonstrates how quickly a previously united organisation or community can fracture into armed camps when its political agreement collapses.
South West State is now approaching a similar danger.
President Hassan Sheikh's responsibility
Primary responsibility for any act of warfare rests with the party that launches an attack, kills civilians or violates the laws of war. Political responsibility for creating the conditions of conflict, however, extends beyond the party that fires the first bullet.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud was commander-in-chief of the armed forces, head of the Federal Government and the principal advocate of the constitutional and electoral policies at the centre of the dispute in South West State.
His administration had the opportunity to pursue dialogue, mediation and an electoral process agreed upon by the competing parties. Instead, federal forces were used to take control of the capital of a federal member state involved in a political dispute with Villa Somalia.
President Hassan Sheikh cannot therefore distance himself from the consequences of that decision.
If the conflict spreads across South West State, if communities in Bay and Bakool take up arms, if more civilians are killed or if Al-Shabaab exploits the divisions, the President will be asked why military force was chosen to resolve a political disagreement.
He will also be asked why federal troops were sent to Baidoa while substantial parts of Somalia remain under Al-Shabaab's control.
The Somali National Army was established to defend the Somali people and confront armed organisations threatening the country. When it is used to influence an election in a federal member state, it risks losing the confidence of some of the very people it is obligated to protect.
The Federal Government alleged that Al-Shabaab members accompanied the forces supporting Laftagareen during the latest fighting. Officials from the South West administration led by Aden Madobe said they recovered bodies and captured prisoners belonging to the group.
Those allegations have not been independently verified. But even if Al-Shabaab members exploited the attack, the central political question remains: who created the vacuum and divisions that allowed the organisation to penetrate the conflict?
“When leadership disputes are settled through military force, they create conditions that terrorist groups can exploit,†security analyst Samira Gaid told the Associated Press. “Somali civilians ultimately pay the price.â€
The humanitarian danger
Baidoa hosts a large population of internally displaced people who fled drought, conflict and poverty. The city's health services are already struggling with shortages of beds, medicines and personnel.
A Médecins Sans Frontières report published in July found that one in four children living in Baidoa's displacement camps was suffering from acute malnutrition.
A prolonged conflict could obstruct humanitarian deliveries, close supply routes, interrupt health services and force additional families from their homes.
Political tensions and fears of fighting had already displaced more than 50,000 people during March and early April, according to the United Nations refugee agency.
The danger is not limited to Baidoa. If the conflict develops into the mobilisation of armed communities, it could spread to other districts in Bay and Bakool before reaching Lower Shabelle and neighbouring areas.
A constitutional dispute transformed into war
The South West crisis is part of the wider dispute concerning Somalia's Constitution and the mandates of its federal institutions.
Under the four-year timetable established by the 2012 Provisional Constitution, President Hassan Sheikh's mandate was expected to end on May 15, 2026.
Villa Somalia argues that constitutional amendments extending presidential and parliamentary terms to five years authorise the current institutions to remain in office. The opposition, Puntland, Jubaland and other political actors reject that interpretation. They argue that the amendments lacked national consensus and cannot retrospectively extend a mandate granted under the previous constitutional framework.
Regardless of the different positions on that controversy, the Federal Government cannot acquire legitimacy to use national forces to select or replace the leaders of federal member states.
Villa Somalia says it is leading Somalia towards universal suffrage. However, the people of South West State were not permitted to choose directly between Laftagareen, Aden Madobe and other candidates.
Aden Madobe was selected by a regional parliament operating in a city taken over by federal forces after the previous administration had been removed. This reinforces suspicions that the electoral process was used to legitimise an outcome initially achieved through military force.
Baidoa's warning
The lesson from 1995 is not that Aidid and the present Federal Government operate under identical circumstances. The lesson is that the strongest military actor may capture Baidoa but cannot obtain public acceptance through weapons.
Aidid captured the city, but his occupation produced the RRA, which eventually expelled his forces.
Villa Somalia took control of Baidoa, removed Laftagareen and supported the election of Aden Madobe. But the result was not stability. It produced armed resistance, civilian deaths, divisions within the security forces and an opportunity for Al-Shabaab to exploit the conflict.
The solution will not be found through another military offensive. It requires an immediate ceasefire, an end to the use of federal forces in political competition, independent mediation led by South West elders and an inclusive political process.
Former Somali President Hassan Sheikh still has an opportunity to prevent the conflict from spreading. But if he continues attempting to substitute military force for political agreement, responsibility for the consequences will not end with the commanders fighting in Baidoa.
It will extend directly to Villa Somalia and the President who decided that a political dispute should be resolved through the national army.
GaROWE ONLINEÂ
